Game-based Vehicle-to-Grid Energy Interaction Model Considering Car Owners’ Willingness and Costs
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摘要:
针对电动汽车（Electric Vehicle， EV）在参与需求响应时对用户意愿考量不足，配网与EV利益分配不公的问题，提出了考虑用户响应成本及意愿的V2G能量交互策略. 对EV用户在交互中产生的充电时间延迟和电池劣化成本进行了量化与分析，并使得EV车主能够通过指定其成本系数的方式来表达他们的互动意愿，从而获得合理的补偿.随后，建立配电系统运营商（Distribution System Operator， DSO）和集群EV之间的双层斯托伯格（Stackelberg）博弈模型，并根据Karush-Kuhn-Tucker条件，将其转换为一个单层混合整数二阶锥规划问题.基于IEEE 33节点系统验证了模型的有效性，实现了EV车主和DSO之间的双赢.
Abstract:
A V2G energy interaction strategyconsidering the cost of response and EV owners’ willingness is proposed， to address the issues of insufficient consideration of user willingnesswhen electric vehicles （EV） participate in demand response and the unfair distribution of benefits between the power grid and EVs in demand response. The strategy quantifies and analyzes the charging time delay and battery degradation costs incurred by EV users in the interaction.And allows EV owners to express their interactive willingness by specifying their cost coefficients to obtain reasonable compensation. Subsequently， a two-level Stackelberg game model between the distribution system operator （DSO） and EVs clusters is established and converted into a single-level mixed-integer second-order cone programming （MISOCP） problem based on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The effectiveness of the model is verified on the IEEE 33-node system， and a win-win situation between EV owners and DSO is achieved.
