A V2G energy interaction strategyconsidering the cost of response and EV owners’ willingness is proposed， to address the issues of insufficient consideration of user willingnesswhen electric vehicles （EV） participate in demand response and the unfair distribution of benefits between the power grid and EVs in demand response. The strategy quantifies and analyzes the charging time delay and battery degradation costs incurred by EV users in the interaction.And allows EV owners to express their interactive willingness by specifying their cost coefficients to obtain reasonable compensation. Subsequently， a two-level Stackelberg game model between the distribution system operator （DSO） and EVs clusters is established and converted into a single-level mixed-integer second-order cone programming （MISOCP） problem based on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The effectiveness of the model is verified on the IEEE 33-node system， and a win-win situation between EV owners and DSO is achieved.